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The rise of China as a genuine world power, economically and militarily, constitutes the gravest challenge faced by the liberal international order constructed in the aftermath of the Great Depression and the Second World War. A major source of strain in the trade relations between China and the other core members of the liberal world trading system is its extensive use of state-owned enterprises as an instrument of general (domestic) economic policy. This paper builds on Ruggie's theory of embedded liberalism and the theory of economic policy to characterize the political and economic difficulties and opportunities in moving toward a new regime for dealing with subsidies. The conclusion sketches some goals such a regime should seek to embody.

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the set of norms, rules and institutions (the regime) which regulate the domestic politics of international trade policy in the US. It is particularly concerned to explain the simultaneous occurrence of successful participation in multilateral trade liberalization in the GATT and rising levels of protection via the administered protection mechanisms (e.g. anti-dumping and countervailing duty, and escape clause). The explanation of this phenomenon is the development of a new institutional definition of trade policy that permitted executive dominance of trade policy, in conjunction with a changed perception of the role of trade policy by the executive branch. Specifically, it is argued that post-war executives (at least until Reagan) came to associate trade policy with broader foreign policy goals.

Basis for executive-legislative relationships since the 1930s; based on conference paper. Partial contents: Congressional responsiveness, asymmetric political pressure, and structural protectionist bias; The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934: institutional foundation for a revolution in US trade policy; The rise of the national security state and the executive's preference for trade liberalization.

Political economy is the systematic study of the interaction
between the political and the economic. As such, political economy
imposes a heavy burden on it s practitioners: conscious attention to the
very real advances of political science and economics. Political economy
should not be treated as an open invitation to bad analysis in the name
of cross-disciplinary effort. Sadly, it is often taken for just such an
invitation and the book under review here is a good example. Adams and
Iqbal propose to present a political- economic analysis of Pakistan's
economic development with particular emphasis on export policy. Such a
study may have two rather different constituencies: country specialists
and/or development and political economy generalists. The former is
clearly not the case. The political analysis derives almost entirely
from existing secondary sources and the economic discussion is
theoretical, ad hoc and based on readily available data. Thus we may
presume that the contribution is to be found in the particular
theoretical or methodological app roach and, therefore, of interest to
generalists as well as specialists.